I s the U.S. property & casualty (P&C) insurance industry overcapitalized? Many practitioners and industry observers claim that the industry is awash in capital, and that this excess capital has driven prices to historical lows. Others claim that the industry is undercapitalized relative to a large but plausible natural disaster, such as a large L.A. earthquake, or a Category 5 hurricane through Miami --a "super catastrophe" in industry jargon.
Why does this confusion exist? The key problem is that there is no widely accepted framework for linking risk to required capital. Discussions on capital adequacy for the industry tend to focus solely on a comparison between the total potential insured losses in a major catastrophe, and the total amount of surplus in the industry. Scientific analysis of the risks involved and the capital required are rarely included in discussions about capital adequacy between insurers and rating agencies. Ultimately insurers tend to abdicate the responsibility to the rating agencies for understanding capital adequacy. The rating agencies, in turn, seem to focus more on relative rather than absolute capital requirements. If the industry in aggregate becomes overcapitalized, the average requirements for capital relative to risk increase. In the absence of an objective standard for choosing a more optimal level of capital, rating agencies have an unconstrained incentive to always prefer more capital to less capital. This confusion over the linkage between risk and capital has implications at the individual insurer level as well. Without knowing how much capital is required to support different risks, insurers cannot price the risks properly. For capital-intensive businesses like the P&C insurance business, one of the largest drivers of pricing is the cost of capital (both the amount of capital and the required return) to support the risk. Thus, insurers tend to manage the capital available rather than the capital required to support their risks. This can lead insurers to accumulate excess capital during periods of low claims, which results in underpricing of risk on average, and a pronounced cyclicality in pricing --the underwriting cycle. Indeed, The Economist recently published a high-profile assessment of the P&C insurance industry that claimed that capital management is the Achilles heel of the industry. 1
DFA HAS BEEN SLOW TO RESPOND
Over the past several years, the P&C actuarial community has been working on similar models for measuring enterprise risk, and linking such risk measures to management decisions. This effort has been galvanized around the term dynamic financial analysis, or DFA. While DFA claims that one of its goals is linking risk and capital, it has been slow to produce robust results. 2 The Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS) defines DFA as the process for analyzing the financial condition of an insurance enterprise. Financial condition refers to the ability of the company's capital and surplus to adequately support the company's future operations 3 . . . the DFA concept broadens the scope of the actuary's analysis to encompass the entire balance sheet as well as the company's business plans over some future horizon. 4 While the CAS's definition of DFA is quite broad, and does not specify the technique for analysis, in practice DFA has come to mean "multi-period simulationbased stochastic analysis of statutory and GAAP financials." It defines a technique for generating probabilistic financial results, but does not provide a framework for linking risk to required capital.
As noted by Hodes et al. [1996] :
The existing literature on the financial modeling of property-casualty insurance companies consists predominantly of theoretical discourses seen through the eyes of the research actuary. The sophistication of complex stochastic simulation is extolled; the practical implementation of the models is rarely considered. 5 One of the key problems with DFA is that it is descriptive rather than prescriptive. DFA starts with a methodology, and generates reports that show distributions of the components of an insurer's income statement and balance sheet over time. The decision-making framework is left up to the user, with the implicit assumption that the user will be able to incorporate the new reports into his or her existing decision-making framework.
This article proposes an approach called P&C RAROC (Property & Casualty Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital) , that is based on a results-driven analysis: start with the decision-making framework, and then build supporting reports and methodological framework to support it (Exhibit 1).
P&C RAROC AS A DECISION SUPPORT TOOL
The P&C RAROC framework is simple: each activity should be evaluated based on whether its return on capital is above or below its equity hurdle rate. Methodologies and reports are required to determine the following questions:
• How much capital is required for each activity?
• What is the expected return on that capital?
• What is the equity hurdle rate for that activity?
Our proposed approach for measuring required capital, or Economic Capital, is a synthesis of techniques from actuarial science, financial engineering, and corporate finance. This approach, along with the measure of Risk-Adjusted Return on Economic Capital, or RAROC, is adapted from a similar framework that has been developed in the banking industry over the past ten years. We refer to this collection of methodologies as P&C RAROC. 6 Because P&C RAROC focuses on a single application, it is constructed more simply than most DFA models. First, it focuses on volatility of economic value, thus collapsing multiple distributions of cashflows over time to a single distribution of value. While this model is simpler, it does not accurately account for tax effects, and the results cannot be used for exact accounting projections. Second, the Economic Capital model is pri- This article begins by describing the history, framework, and implementation approach for Economic Capital. It then defines Risk-Adjusted Return on Economic Capital -RAROC-and explains how it should be compared with an equity hurdle rate. Next, the article shows the results of a "top-down" analysis of the U.S. P&C insurance industry 7 to illustrate both capital adequacy and capital productivity. The article concludes with suggestions for how these measures can be used to improve financial management in the P&C insurance industry.
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ECONOMIC CAPITAL DEFINED
History of Economic Capital
While the P&C industry has come under fire for poor capital management discipline, the U.S. banking industry has been praised for its strong capital management discipline. 8 This would have been surprising a decade ago, when banks suffered from the same capital management problems as today's P&C insurers. What led to this change in the banking sector?
The short answer is that many banks have developed approaches for linking risk and required capital. 9 In fact, this practice has become so widespread, that regulators now expect all large, complex banks implement a method for measuring risk and linking it to required capital. In a recent supervisory recommendation, the Federal Reserve asserts:
It is particularly important that large institutions and others with complex risk profiles be able to assess their current capital adequacy and future capital needs in a systematic and comprehensive manner in light of their risk profiles and business plans. In providing guidance to examiners and supervisors, this letter is also intended to encourage such banking organizations to strengthen their risk management capabilities as well as to integrate these capabilities more fully into evaluations of their own capital adequacy. 10 This framework for linking risk to required capital served to stimulate innovation in market, credit, and operating risk measurement, as banks realized that measuring, capitalizing, and pricing risk were essential for ensuring adequate safety to debtholders, and for creating shareholder value.
P&C insurers face similar market, credit, and operating risks as banks, but have additional liability risks, such as catastrophe risk, and non-catastrophe claims risk. The remainder of this section describes an approach to measuring Economic Capital and RAROC that is based on the banking model, with additional modifications and special tailoring to the different risk characteristics of the P&C industry.
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for capital calculation is based on Merton's model of default. 11 This model can be summarized as follows:
• Shareholders own a put option --the option to "put" the firm to the debtholders in the event that present value of the firm's equity (intrinsic value) drops to zero. • Debtholders (or policyholders) charge the shareholders for this probability of default by demanding a spread over the risk-free rate on the funds they provide.
• The probability of default is a function of the distribution of the firm's intrinsic value and its available capital.
Economic Capital is the amount of capital required to provide a given level of safety (the "solvency standard") to policyholders, over a specified time horizon, given the enterprise-wide risk distribution of the insurer (Exhibit 2). Likewise when attributing Economic Capital to activities within an insurer (e.g., at the product line or business unit level), each activity is leveraged to the same level of policyholder risk.
When the RAROC approach was developed for banks, the solvency standard for debtholders was based on the probability of default. The assumption was made that the debtholder only cared about ensuring an adequately small probability of default, and was not concerned about the loss given default, also called severity. incorporated severity and coined the term expected policyholder deficit (EPD) as a measure of the policyholder solvency standard. 12 The top-down analysis in this article uses the probability of default framework because it is easier to implement than the EPD approach. Our work compares the two approaches and suggests that the difference between the two approaches from a topdown perspective is small.
Measuring Economic Capital involves integrating the tail of the distribution of an insurer's intrinsic value up to the desired probability of default. This has been described in the actuarial literature as a value at risk (VaR) approach. In order to reflect true economics, VaR calculations use market value of assets and liabilities. Numerous authors have noted the merits of a valuebased approach:
Value at risk (VaR) offers an alternative way of thinking about, measuring, and managing risk that has three important virtues lacked by other, more traditional measures of risk. First, VaR is intelligible. Roughly speaking, VaR for a firm, a project, or a security is simply the amount of money that it could lose under extremely adverse circumstances . . . Second, VaR is comparable [across different activities and different types of risk] . . . Third, VaR enables us to answer important questions. 13 Market-value accounting, which sets all balance sheet items at current realizable value, is particularly suitable for solvency assessment, since an insurer's failure usually results in liquidation of the balance sheet or purchase of the company, both in market transactions. 14 
Implementation for P&C Insurers
The conceptual framework outlined above is implemented as follows:
1. Generate standalone distributions for each component risk; 2. Measure Economic Capital for each component on a standalone basis; 3. Aggregate component risks incorporating inter-risk correlations, and measure Economic Capital required to support all risks (this will be less than the sum of the standalone risks from
Step 2); and 4. Determine Economic Capital contribution for each component (effectively dividing up the diversification benefit).
In generating value distributions, we break the three broad risk types into six risk categories (Exhibit 3).
The component risk types are selected based on differences in risk drivers and distribution types. Each risk type is then measured using risk measurement techniques from both the banking or insurance sectors. For example, we measure credit and market risk separately because the distribution for credit risk (low frequency, high severity correlated losses) differs significantly from the distribution for market risk (typically higher frequency, lower severity). The definition of each risk type is shown in Exhibit 4.
Credit Risk. Credit risk measurement draws on models developed in banking over the past several years. Credit risk portfolio models are based on statistical modeling of default risk in a frequency/severity/correlation framework.
The fundamental theory behind credit risk measurement is related to the same Merton model of default on which the economic capital theory is built. That is, the shareholders have the right to put the firm to the Catastrophe debtholders in the event that the value of the firm is less than the value of the debt. Because of the option-like nature of credit risk, the transformation between changes in the overall macroeconomy and the default rate will be highly non-linear, as shown in Exhibit 5. There are three approaches commonly used to characterize the credit loss distribution. These techniques draw from different sciences --finance, econometrics, and actuarial science. The first two techniques focus on defining the transformation function, and the third approach characterizes the distribution of default rate directly.
• Merton-based approach. 15 Model credit default as an explicit option on the underlying firm value. This is a microeconomic model, and uses equity price volatilities and correlations as inputs. The option valuation formula defines the shape of the transformation function.
• Econometric approach. 16 Model credit default as a nonlinear function of macroeconomic drivers. This involves regressing default rate against changes in the underlying macroeconomic variables. The regression analysis defines the shape of the transformation function.
• Actuarial approach. 17 Assume a default rate distribution (commonly Gamma or Beta) and fit the mean and standard deviation to empirical default distributions.
For a more in-depth treatment of the different techniques, refer to Koyluoglu and Hickman [1998] Perhaps the most important credit risk for P&C insurers is counterparty credit risk to reinsurers. Primary insurers face the risk of loss if reinsurers either cannot or will not pay their claims. This type of credit risk is more complex than corporate bond credit risk because it is more difficult to characterize credit exposure. Reinsurance recoverables vary along with the levels of claims for which they provide cover. That is, the exposure to a reinsurance counterparty is a random variable. This is similar to the counterparty credit risk that banks face when entering into derivatives contracts. The banking industry has developed an approach to measuring this risk that characterizes the exposure distribution using expected exposure and maximum likely exposure. 19 While reinsurer counterparty risk is conceptually analogous to derivatives counterparty risk, there is an important difference: there is a much higher correlation between exposure and default for reinsurers. The event most likely to take a reinsurer into default is the same event that will cause primary insurers to have a large exposure to reinsurers --a large unexpected industrywide loss event. This is different from derivatives credit risk, where the market movements of derivatives contracts are less likely to materially affect the default probabilities of counterparties.
Market Risk. Market risk measurement starts with VaR approaches developed originally for measuring trading risk for investment banks and commercial banks. This approach treats market risk exposure as a portfolio of securities with correlated random price movements. The price movements themselves are the product of a risk factor movement (e.g., a change in the five-year risk-free rate) and a risk factor sensitivity (e.g., the partial derivative of the portfolio value with respect to a change in the five-year interest rate). The banking industry uses three different approaches for calculating VaR: parametric, Monte Carlo, and historical simulation.
Parametric VaR is calculated as:
where C is the covariance matrix of risk factor movements and x is the vector of risk factor sensitivities. For more details on parametric VaR measurement, see J.P. Morgan's RiskMetrics™ documentation, 20 or read about a discussion on the pros and cons of these approaches. 21 In short, the parametric approach is computationally much faster, Monte Carlo simulation adds accuracy to VaR calculations for non-linear instruments, historical simulation relaxes the normality assumption for the risk factors.
Because VaR was originally designed for trading activities, the market standard for VaR measurement is a one-day movement at a 97.5% confidence (1.96 standard deviations, assuming normal distribution 22 ). However, for purposes of measuring Economic Capital, we look at a one-year horizon and a much higher confidence level (greater than 99.90% for investment grade institutions). In translating daily VaR to Economic Capital, in a simulation model we consider the changes in VaR throughout the year, the autocorrelations 23 of daily returns, as well as the economic effects of possible management actions in response to significant changes in portfolio value.
Non-Catastrophe Insurance Risk. Non-catastrophe liability risk arises from the variability in the amount, timing, and certainty of claims. For non-catastrophe liability risk measurement, the Economic Capital methodology draws on statistical analysis of historical claims behavior. This approach characterizes the amount and timing of future claims payouts directly, without reference to the heuristics currently employed in reserving practices. As noted by Panning 
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Economic Conditions mining VaR . . . these methods are essentially ad hoc, in that they lack a basis in an underlying model of the data. As a consequence they produce parameters without reference to a welldefined statistical measure of goodness of fit to the data . . . because of this they provide no statistical basis for estimating the magnitudes and probabilities of possible deviations from the estimates they produce. 24 The reserving process focuses on determining whether or not published reserve estimates are a reasonable estimate for expected future losses. In practice the reserving process is a "search for the mean" rather than an attempt to characterize the full distribution of future losses. The Economic Capital methodology characterizes the full distribution of future claims, within a statistically robust framework.
Historical claims are recorded via loss triangles. Loss triangles are tables summarizing the development over time of total claims from policies written in a particular accident year where development period is the time from exposure to claim payment. For lines like homeowners insurance, where losses are often reported within the year of coverage, the development period is short (referred to as short-tailed lines). On the other hand, for lines like commercial liability, losses can emerge from policies written decades ago, and development periods can be quite long (long-tailed lines). Examples of a long-tailed and a short-tailed loss triangle are shown in Exhibit 6.
Our approach analyzes loss triangles for each business line, and fit a probability distribution for the present value of losses of each development year. In addition, the correlations between different accident years, development years and business lines are estimated to calculate diversification benefits. Non-catastrophe liability risk capital is calculated for a one calendar year horizon. There are several accident years at different development stages in one calendar year and the correlations across these risk sources are needed to calculate total liability risk Economic Capital for a business line.
In this analysis, non-catastrophe liability risk is classified into two sub-groups, namely process and parameter risk. Process risk is due to the randomness of the claims process, assuming the initial estimate of the expected loss at various development years and other distribution parameters are correct. Parameter risk considers uncertainty in the parameters used. The parameters are usually estimated from historical data with additional actuarial adjustments. Pure parameter risk calculations are based on standard error measures.
For an accident year, both the process and parameter risks are expected to decrease, as a percentage of total risk, with time, due to realization of claims. Our RAROC calculations reflect this by developing a decaying profile for capital requirements (see Exhibit 7).
Catastrophe Risk. Traditional actuarial techniques used by insurers and reinsurers to analyze property risk have typically relied on the pattern of historical insurance loss experience to estimate future losses. Today, it is widely recognized that this approach is inadequate to quantify the range of risk from catastrophic windstorms, tropical cyclones (e.g., typhoons) and earthquakes because:
• Catastrophic events are relatively rare in any specific geographic location, thereby providing little historical data for meaningful statistical analysis; • The number of exposed properties, the geographical distribution of these properties, and the property values may change over time, making past exposure a poor indicator of current exposure; • Building materials and designs typically change over time, making the building stock in place during past catastrophes an unreliable indicator of current building stock; and • Changes in the costs of building repair and contents replacement affect the amount of loss that will result from catastrophes, making losses based on past repair costs or contents replacement costs potentially poor indicators of current costs.
Because historical catastrophic loss data is limited, it is difficult to fit a credible loss distribution for all perils and geographies. P&C RAROC utilizes aggregate exceedance probability (AEP) output from a catastrophe risk model. This output is a curve that maps potential catastrophe losses to the probability of that loss being exceeded. A catastrophe risk computer model provides a stochastic representation of loss probability, using methodologies based on certain analytical, engineering and empirical techniques. Such loss estimation methodologies incorporate established principles of meteorology, seismology, wind and earthquake engineering, and related fields. Exhibit 8 describes the major components of a typical catastrophe model.
The hazard module defines the range of potential stochastic events representing the natural hazards (such as earthquakes and hurricanes) in terms of their physical characteristics and their probability of occurrence. The input of this module consists of historic data (such as storm catalogs or earthquake history), site characteristics (such as terrain roughness or soil conditions), scientific knowledge and expert opinion. The output of the hazard module consists of a set of stochastic events, often numbering in the thousands for a particular geographic region, and their determinant characteristics at each location, such as wind speeds for hurricanes or ground motion for earthquakes.
The damage (vulnerability) module then determines the damage caused by a specific storm or earthquake to the structures, such as houses, industrial installations or infrastructure. The output of this module is the estimated damage caused by that specific event to each of the various structures.
The financial analysis module then applies these damages against the insurance or reinsurance contract specifications to determine the impact of the estimated event (if any) on the relevant policies and calculates the ultimate financial losses.
Operating Risk. Operating risk covers two types of risk: business risk, or the risk of volatility in volumes and margins, and event risk, the risk of loss due to management errors or other events that disrupt business.
For the P&C insurance business, business risk is substantial, because of the volatility (and cyclicality) in pricing adequacy. Pricing risk is modeled by measuring historical volatility in pricing adequacy, and volume risk is modeled based on historical volatility in premium volumes.
Event risk is modeled using a frequency/severity approach based on a database of losses from other companies in the financial services industry.
Aggregation. After each risk is measured on a standalone basis, the distributions are combined, accounting for correlations across all risk types. This allows us to calculate diversification benefits. 
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are obtained by calculating total risk with and without component risks. Since this method calculates contributions based on large changes in the portfolio, the diversification benefits are overestimated at each iteration, and must be corrected prior to performing the next iteration. This method is becoming widely used in practice, because of its simplicity. However, it is a poor approximation of the true risk contributions, and might lead to inaccurate results. Hence it should not be used to calculate risk contributions. In several internal numerical studies, we found that the results obtained from Myers-Read methodology, VaRC, ULC and our continuous marginal contributions approach are similar. We also observed that these risk contributions are significantly different than the ones obtained from the discrete marginal contribution approach. Cummins [1999] also observed large difference in results between the Myers-Read formula and the discrete approach of Merton and Perold [1993] .
The final step of reattributing the aggregate capital back to the sources of risk meets the following criteria:
• Based on marginal risk contribution. This allows Economic Capital to be used for decision-making at the margin (e.g., does this policy create value after accounting for its marginal capital cost?) • Additive to total Economic Capital. This allows Economic Capital to be aggregated along any dimension (e.g., by business unit, or statutory line, or both).
Essentially, the diversification benefits are attributed to each activity based on its contribution of risk to the entire portfolio. This approach yields the intuitive result that diversification benefits are larger for those risks that have low or zero correlation with the rest of the portfolio.
RAROC DEFINED
Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital --RAROC --is a measure of the expected return on Economic Capital over the life of a policy. This prospective measure of risk-adjusted profitability allows for apples-to-apples comparison of activities across risk types and businesses.
RAROC for Insurance Activities
In the banking sector, RAROC for an activity is calculated as where τ is the effective corporate tax rate. Net income is calculated on a matched-funded basis. For a lending activity, net income is calculated assuming that the activity is fully debt financed at the institution's wholesale borrowing rate. The interest on capital is calculated at the same wholesale borrowing rate, to account for the fact that the activity is partially funded with equity. Note that net income is reduced by expected loss (the mean of the loss distribution) which is likely to be different from the actual loss in any given period. This is the accepted practice in the banking industry where the payments are received periodically over the life of the business, in the form of the interest rate charged on loans.
However, for the P&C insurance business, cashflows are not periodically distributed over the life of a policy. Rather, premiums are received up-front, while claims are often paid at random intervals over the life of a policy. Thus, a single-period net income number does not accurately reflect the lifetime economics of a policy. Thus, we use the same general approach for calculating RAROC as was used in the banking approach, but we smooth the present value of profits over the Economic Capital profile for the entire life of the contract. RAROC for an accident year is calculated as:
where the discount rate used for the present value of claims, present value of expenses, and the interest on capital is the insurer's marginal borrowing rate, 31 and the rate used to present value the Economic Capital is the risk-free rate. The Economic Capital and expected claims profiles shown in Exhibit 7 are required for the calculation of RAROC.
RAROC for Investment Activities
The RAROC of the investment portfolio is evaluated separately as RAROC emium PV Expected Claims PV Expenses Interest on Capital
where R P is the portfolio return, R D is the insurer's marginal borrowing rate, MV P is the market value of the portfolio, and τ is the effective corporate tax rate. Note that there is an effective transfer price between the asset activity and liability activities equal to the wholesale cost of funds.
The performance of the portfolio is comparable to a leveraged mutual fund, with the exception that the insurer must pay corporate taxes on the investment returns before paying distributions to shareholders. For insurers domiciled in jurisdictions where corporate profits are taxed, the investment portfolio activities have a substantial handicap relative to leveraged mutual funds or relative to insurers domiciled in tax havens (e.g., Bermuda, Dublin). The risk premium on insurers' securities is taxed twice, once at the corporate level, and again when the return is distributed to the shareholder through dividends and/or capital gains.
Thus, the leveraged aftertax return on the investment portfolio will fall short of the RAROC benchmark by the amount of the tax burden. This raises one of the key issues of strategic asset allocation for P&C insurers: the optimal amount of investment risk balances the benefits of diversification (more investment risk leads to less required capital per unit of liability risk) against the costs of double-taxation. Thus, both the risk and return of the investment activities should be combined with the risk and return of the insurance activities to create a combined RAROC. This way, both the tax penalty and diversification benefits are measured in the same unit. The investment manager can then be measured based on the risk and return of the actual portfolio relative to an appropriate capital market benchmark.
Comparing RAROC to the Hurdle Return
For a given level of firm-wide Economic Capital, an insurer must decide on a minimum (or hurdle) return acceptable on its investment. This should be at least equal to the shareholders' opportunity cost for an investment of equivalent risk, which can be shown to be equal to the market's required return on the insurer's stock, derived from the capital asset pricing model
. 32 Activities with RAROCs above the hurdle rate increase shareholder value, while activities with RAROCs below the hurdle rate diminish shareholder value.
ECONOMIC CAPITAL AND RAROC FOR THE U.S. P&C INDUSTRY
Based on our survey of insurance experts, we have found that this study is the first to evaluate the industry capital requirements of the U.S. P&C insurance industry based on a comprehensive assessment of its component risks.
Objective and Methodology
The objective of the Economic Capital and RAROC industry study is to apply the methodologies described in this article to publicly-available data, in order to measure the capital adequacy of the industry as a whole, and to measure the risk-adjusted profitability of the industry by statutory line of business.
Capital adequacy is measured by comparing required capital (Economic Capital) with available equity capital. Economic Capital is calculated using the techniques described in the prior sections of this article. Available capital is calculated as follows:
Statutory surplus + Unrealized gains on bonds + Discounting adjustment to reserves + Adjustment for reserve conservatism + Real Estate appreciation Available equity capital Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital is measured as the forward-looking expected return for premium written in 1998. The RAROCs represent the returns earned on Economic Capital required to support the industry's risks. It does not reflect the low returns earned on the industry's excess capital.
Data and Approach
The analysis is based on publicly available information from annual statement data (balance sheet, income statement, loss experience) and annual report data (market value of assets and liabilities) of approximately 1,100 P&C insurance and reinsurance companies. Catastrophe risk data was obtained from RMS's proprietary databases, while data on stock index returns and interest rates were collected from industry standard data sources. Other data were provided from Oliver, Wyman & Company/RMS benchmarks. Prior catastrophe losses were eliminated from the industry loss triangles used for non-catastrophe risk assessment, to avoid double-counting for catastrophe risk.
The industry is not treated as a single representative insurance company, since such an approach would understate the total required capital (it would effectively understate the effects of portfolio concentration at the firm level on the required capital at the industry level by assuming that each firm could diversify its exposure by trading risks with every other firm). Rather, the P&C RAROC methodology has been applied to each firm at the individual level (the top twenty-five insurers explicitly, and the remainder in groups based on average characteristics). Since industry data for loss triangles and premium growth are smoother than corresponding data for companies, adjustments are introduced to incorporate company-specific claims volatility and the added volatility from changes in underwriting volume.
Correlations are estimated from data and benchmarks to the extent possible. Missing correlations are assumed based on the authors' judgement. For example, the correlation between catastrophe risk and asset risk is difficult to measure based on historical data, and if measured would not likely be constant. For this relationship we estimated a low but positive correlation (0.10), reflecting the fact that both assets and liabilities would react negatively to unexpected increases in inflation. The sensitivity of results to variations in correlations was tested, and it was found that the economic capital estimates do not change more than 10% for variations in correlations of ±0.20.
Total Economic Capital for the industry is then calculated as the sum of the economic capital for the 1,100 P&C insurers, and compared with the total capital available in the industry to determine the industry's capital adequacy, as described in the prior section.
Results and Insights
This section outlines the results of the study, presented in the form of the five key insights.
Insight #1: The Industry Is Overcapitalized By 20-30%. The premium-weighted industry rating is a weak A+ A.M. Best rating. 33 For an A+ solvency standard, economic capital is calculated to be $365 billion, and for an A 34 solvency standard, Economic Capital is calculated to be $325 billion. The total available capital in the industry is $430 billion, suggesting that the industry is overcapitalized by 20%-30% (Exhibit 9). It is important to note that this observation relates to the average industry capitalization --there is certainly variability in the capital adequacy of individual insurers that this study does not capture.
The excess capital in the P&C industry should either be returned to shareholders, or deployed to support additional risk exposures. The 20%-30% excess capital creates a significant drag on return on equity (ROE), as can be seen by the recent poor total return performance of the S&P 500 P&C index (Exhibit 10). Therefore, reducing capital by 20%-30% would result in an immediate 25% to 35% increase in ROE. Some industry practitioners have argued that capital should not be reduced because a decline in the equity markets could have an adverse impact on insurer solvency. 35 By reserving capital against investment risk, our analysis already addresses this issue.
Insight #2: Investment Risk is the Largest Risk, Followed by Catastrophe Risk. Decomposing the relative contributions to economic capital according to risk type 36 (Exhibit 11) reveals several interesting insights.
The first result shows that 37% of the total capital supports investment risk (market risk and interest rate risk combined). This suggests that the P&C industry resembles a leveraged, tax-inefficient 37 bond (60%) and equity (20%) mutual fund. The fixed-income instruments and equities play an important role in providing diversification benefits for catastrophe and non-catastrophe liability risks. However, U.S.-based P&C insurers accrue an added tax liability that is not assumed by shareholders that invest directly in equities via a mutual fund. P&C insurers must optimize between the tax disadvantage of capital gains on holding equities and the diversification benefits of holding equities.
The second result shows that fully one-third of the total Economic Capital in the industry is invested in catastrophe risk. This suggests that the second function of the industry is that it is a catastrophe risk fund. This underscores the importance of understanding catastrophe risk and its linkage to capital in managing shareholder value.
The third result shows that operating risk, at 10% of total Economic Capital, is lower than a typical commercial bank (30% of total Economic Capital). This can be attributed to a lower fixed cost base for the P&C industry than for the banking industry, given the more variable nature of the P&C distribution channel (agents as compared to branches).
It is important to note that the economic capital contributions shown above are for the industry in aggregate, and that the relative division of capital according to risk type varies significantly across companies.
Exhibit 12 shows how the split of Economic Capital by risk type can vary dramatically depending on the business mix and investment strategy of the company.
Insight #3: Diversification Benefits Are Large. One of the key risk and capital-related advantages that P&C companies have over banks is that P&C liability risk is largely uncorrelated with asset risk. The source of systematic correlation between liability risk and market risk is inflation, e.g., the discount rate applied in the calculation of present value of liabilities risk and bond valuation. We assume this correlation to be low (approximately 0.20). In addition, the correlation between market risk and catastrophe risk is assumed to be 0.10. This low correlation produces substantial diversification benefits across risk types. Without accounting for diversification, the total required Economic Capital for the U.S. P&C industry would be $480 billion (the "incorrect" sum of standalone Economic Capital) at the A solvency standard level. Accounting for diversification across risk types yield an Economic Capital requirement of $325 billion (see Exhibit 13) --a diversification benefit of approximately 33%. This is substantially larger than the 20% diversification benefit typically seen in a large, diversified corporate bank.
Insight #4: Common Approaches for Setting Catastrophe Risk Limits are Inappropriate. An important question asked of many insurers is to what degree are catastrophe-related risk accumulations being adequately monitored and managed. In turn, insurers may ask, "How does this new method of viewing capital relate to the method I currently employ?" A common approach currently employed is to compare loss for catastrophe risk at a given probability (exceedance probability, or return period) 38 to statutory surplus and reinsurance. Current industry practice suggests that companies should be capitalized to support between the 100 and 500 year return period catastrophe loss. Most RMS clients try to contain or limit their catastrophe risk to these benchmarks, and A.M. Best 39 recently defined a reasonable catastrophe loss to qualify for a Secure A.M. Best's Rating (B+ to A++) . . . as the [probable maximum loss] "PML" from either an earthquake (using the 250-year return period) or a hurricane (using the 100-year return period). 40 A key insight from this study is that it is inappropriate to set catastrophe risk limits by comparing the catastrophe loss distribution to the total surplus. This approach ignores the capital required for all other risk types. Our view is that capital adequacy should be measured by comparing total risk (including liability, asset, and operating risk) to total available capital. 41 Using the Economic Capital approach to assessing capital adequacy, the implied return period for a given amount of catastrophe loss varies widely depending on an insurer's mix of other risks. While more complicated than the simpler PML/return period approach, the Economic Capital approach is necessary to have a complete and accurate picture of capital adequacy.
Insight #5: Catastrophe Risk Impacts RAROC More Than It Impacts Solvency. This study suggests that the industry has sufficient capital to support its catastro- phe liabilities (and other risks) at current standards of solvency. However, an analysis of the RAROCs by line suggests that the concern should not be one of solvency, but RAROC and economic value. Exhibit 14 shows average RAROCs by line for the industry based on 1998 premiums and expense ratios. The horizontal axis on the chart illustrates how much Economic Capital is required for each activity, and the vertical axis shows the RAROC for that activity.
The average RAROC for the industry is 10% --this is the expected return on the capital required to support the industry's risks. The additional $60 to $100 billion of excess capital earns approximately 4.6% ROE. 42 The activities with RAROCs in excess of the hurdle rate create shareholder value, while those below the hurdle rate deplete shareholder value.
An interesting implication of this chart is that the lines exposed to catastrophe risk (commercial multi-peril and homeowners/farmowners) have the lowest RAROCs. This suggests that the real problem that catastrophe risk introduces is not related to solvency, but is related to RAROC and economic value. While the industry has enough capital to support catastrophe risk, it does not price this risk to earn an adequate return on that capital for its shareholders. In contrast, the line with the least risk, auto liability, appears to be attractively priced (relative to a typical 15% hurdle), suggesting that the industry does not recognize that these lines require considerably less capital than the average lines. Or indeed it may be that insurers, unable to price adequately for catastrophe risk, attempt to supplement the profitability in the lower risk lines.
While this top-down industry view shows a small number of aggregated lines, a bottom-up RAROC analysis by line and business unit for a given insurer is likely to identify more extreme variability of RAROCs across lines. RAROC can be used as an important strategic tool in deciding how to optimize across business product mix, pricing, and capital management. In practice, low RAROC and high RAROC business lines might be tied. For example auto and homeowners policies tend to be linked, so RAROC by customer is more important for strategic decisions. The most important conclusion of this study is that the Economic Capital and RAROC framework that has helped banks to manage risk and capital is also a valuable management tool for the P&C industry. The methodology applied to the overall industry provides reasonable and intuitive results. Consequently, insurers should next focus on applying the analytical approach at more detailed levels to inform strategic and tactical decisions. Exhibit 15 illustrates the relationship between the absolute level of firmwide capital, the relative contributions of Economic Capital according to business line, and the Risk-Adjusted Return on Capital. By combining RAROC with hurdle and growth rates, one can calculate the intrinsic value of these businesses as well. 43 We believe that the P&C RAROC framework could contribute to the evolution of a capital management approach for insurers, similar to the secular transformation that occurred in the banking industry. In this scenario, insurers would be more motivated to actively manage the firms' capital in order to maximize the return to shareholders. P&C RAROC would act as a benchmark for performance to discipline insurers to return capital to shareholders when value-creating opportunities do not exist. Investment and reinsurance strategies would be optimized based on the overall asset/liability/operating risk profile. Pricing for capital-intensive businesses such as catastrophe risk may stabilize, and some players may exit the market, finding it unprofitable. The combination of these effects would serve to dampen the insurance cycle, and provide more stable returns to shareholders. Many risks will appear on the balance sheets of reinsurers and in the capital markets, as most insurers 44 realize that they are tax-disadvantaged holders of risk. While this industry transformation may or may not materialize, we believe that those insurers that adopt the P&C RAROC approach will reap the near-term benefits of improved capital management, and will take the industry one step in the right direction.
ENDNOTES
Helpful comments and discussions were provided by Robert P. Butsic of Fireman's Fund Insurance, J. David Cummins of The Wharton School, and William Panning of ARM Financial. All errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.
1 See "Capital Punishment: The Insurance Industry is in Trouble. The Main Reason is that it has too much capital. Shareholders should ask firms to give it back to them," The Economist, January 16, 1999, p. 61. 2 For a more detailed comparison of P&C RAROC and DFA, see Nakada and Shah [1999] .
3 CAS Forum [1996] . 4 Szkoda [1997] . 5 See Hodes, Neghaiwi, Cummins, Phillips, and Feldblum [1996] .
6 P&C RAROC is a set of proprietary methodologies developed jointly by Oliver, Wyman & Company and Risk Management Solutions. 7 To illustrate the point that P&C RAROC is easier to implement than DFA, the top-down industry study took four consultants two months to execute, compared to the multi-year timeframes for typical DFA projects.
8 See "Renaissance Men: America's Banks Might be Doing Something Right." The Economist, April 17, 1999, p. 5. 9 This response was in large part motivated by the substantial corporate lending losses sustained by the industry in the mid-to late 1980s. 10 
